China and the Middle East: Real Strategy or Tactical Flirtation?
Dr.. Dr. Mohamed Makram Balaawi
Tawfiq Hamid

Introduction

Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to the region in March, which included Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, sparked a lot of interest at the international and regional levels, and perhaps most of this interest focused on the agreement signed by the Chinese side with the Iranian side, called the "Strategic Partnership Agreement." Although the text of the agreement has not yet been announced, it is believed that it covers dozens of areas, most importantly energy, infrastructure, economic and financial cooperation, and advanced technology, and Western media claimed that its value exceeds four hundred billion.

On the Arab level, there is concern that the agreement will transform Iran into a more ambitious and interfering power in the affairs of the Arab region, especially in the Gulf, especially if it is accompanied by a breakthrough in Iran's relations with the United States and the lifting of American sanctions, which means that Iran will have been freed from the economic constraints that have shackled its ambitions and that the traditional American partner of the so-called "moderate Arab countries," especially the Gulf states, is withdrawing from the region, leaving these countries exposed - from the Arab point of view - to Iran.from the Arab point of view, which requires these countries to think carefully about how to face the dangers of the coming stage and, if necessary, reconsider the map of alliances and positioning.

At the international level, the United States viewed the agreement with great concern. At a time when the US administration is trying to close sub-files, including the Iranian file, in order to devote itself to the Chinese file, which it considers a threat to US and Western sovereignty, it finds that China is making major breakthroughs at the strategic level in the Middle East and making the US mission difficult.

Washington believes that the Chinese plans mean that Tehran will not remain hostage to the American position, but will practically constitute the end of the actual ability of the United States to impose a blockade and economic sanctions on Iran, as the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects will allow Iran to communicate by land - through Pakistan - with China, and export whatever it wants of gas, oil and whatever it wants, away from the eye of the international watchdog, in a much safer environment than open waters, and the financial and economic partnership between Iran and China will provide an indirect gateway for Iran to the global economy through Chinese banks and companies, and will also mean that it can sell its goods.

By extrapolating Chinese, Iranian, and Arab positions, this paper attempts to understand the ongoing shifts in China's relationship with the region, foresee the future Chinese role in the region, and how Arab countries will deal with a future in which US influence in the Arab region may decline and both Chinese and Iranian influence may grow, by attempting to answer the following questions:

1. Is there a real positive shift in China's foreign policy toward the region, and what are the manifestations of this?
2. How will developing Arab-Chinese relations affect Arab countries' relations with regional countries and major international powers?
3. Did he China's signing of an agreement with Iran is a real shift in relations, and what are the manifestations?
4. How will China deal with the contradictions in the region?
5. Will the region become an area of contention between China and the United States and what is the Arab position on this?

Addressing these major questions and trying to answer them is shrouded in a set of difficulties, the most important of which is that the Sino-Iranian agreement has not been officially announced and therefore it is difficult to accurately predict what the agreement is and build on that, and the Arab positions are still in the process of transformation, especially the Saudi position, which will constitute a variable and important factor at the same time, making this task difficult, but we are certain that raising this issue for discussion will lead to a better understanding of what is happening in this area and will help anticipate and prepare for the future.

China and the Middle East new policy

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's remarks during his recent visit to the region, during which he talked about his country's aspiration to play a greater role in the Middle East, raised questions about China's seriousness in playing this role and the reasons that might make it pay more attention to the Middle East in general and the Arab region in particular, and also raised questions about the implications of this development for the United States and its influence in the region.[1]

The PRC's interest in the Middle East increased by the 1980s as a rival power to the United States and the Soviet Union. This was preceded by its efforts to support its efforts to gain greater international recognition at the expense of its rival, the Republic of China on Taiwan. In 1956 Egypt and Syria became the first countries in the region to establish diplomatic relations with China. Iran, Kuwait and Lebanon abandoned Taiwan to recognize the PRC in 1971, followed by Jordan, Libya and Oman, but this interest remained limited nonetheless.[2]

The Middle East, which is rich in energy resources, is a sensitive region for China. The issue of energy and oil is a strategic issue that China seeks to obtain through the Middle East in an effort to complete and achieve its internal modernization process, after it became the second largest oil importer in the world after the United States. Its oil imports in 2004 were estimated at 1.3 billion tons, half of which came from the Middle East, while it made great efforts to diversify its oil imports, but the Middle East remains the first region to provide them in the future. [3]

While the United States remains Saudi Arabia's most important security partner, the latter is also the most important supplier of oil to China, and an increasingly important economic partner, especially since Beijing's oil reserves will not last more than 20 years if production continues at its current rate, according to estimates. Hence, China has only one of two options if it wants to solve its energy dilemma, either by expanding the use of coal with its destructive damage to the environment, or moving towards strengthening its relations with Middle Eastern countries and obtaining a share of its production, which amounts to half of global production and two-thirds of its reserves.[4]

Moreover, Middle Eastern countries are increasingly looking to Beijing for trade, investments, diplomatic consultations, and even security cooperation, helped by China's image of itself as a neutral power that aims to develop its society and establish equal relations based on respect, mutual benefit, and non-interference in the affairs of others. China has succeeded in maintaining good relations with countries in the region, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel despite the animosity between these countries, and has deservedly succeeded in maintaining good relations with countries in the region, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.[5]

This is evidenced by the recent visit of the Chinese foreign minister to six countries in the Middle East, during which the minister announced the achievement of the expected goals, namely strengthening cooperation with the countries of the region, making China's contribution to peace in the region, agreeing to oppose interference in the internal affairs of other countries, protecting the international system, the core of which is the United Nations and the international order based on international law, multilateralism, international equity and justice, and according to China, countries pledged to increase their practical cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[6]

This initiative, launched by current Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, is the most important lever for China's foreign interests and the orbit of many of its foreign policies, and one of the most important, costly and complex development and strategic plans in human history. Through it, China is trying to improve its geostrategic position and build confidence regionally with neighboring countries and globally with major powers, but at the same time it faces many challenges, most notably border issues, both land and sea, which sometimes amount to crises and disputes, as is the case with India on land or in China's East and South China Seas.[7]

China based its vision for the project, through which it aims to change the face of Asia, on a project more than two thousand years old, the Silk Road, which stretched from China through Central Asia to the shores of the Mediterranean and from there extended by sea to Europe, which received Asian goods, including spices, porcelain, and Chinese silk. In its initiative, China found solutions to chronic issues that have plagued it for decades, including empowering internal states and facilitating their integration into the global economy, linking and strengthening the affiliation of border states with the center and raising their economic well-being, especially Xinjiang (formerly East Turkestan) and Tibet, where separatist tendencies are growing, sometimes taking an armed form.

In 2015, the Chinese government announced the "Vision and Principles" paper, which included the broad outlines of the initiative and invited Asian countries and the world to join it, which indicates that the economic corridors that have been adopted are six, half of which pass or end on the banks of the Mediterranean, through the Middle East and Arab countries, and this makes China pay great attention to the region in the public relations plan it practices to convince the world of the initiative.[8]

The Middle East is also a major economic market for Chinese products, and its importance increases because it provides a platform for China to develop multilateral diplomacy and present itself to the world as a responsible and disciplined power by dealing with many hotspots such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and more generally the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iranian nuclear issue, and others, which are not only regional but also global issues.[9]

China measures its influence and presence in the Middle East primarily by its ability to secure energy supplies, trade relations and benefits, and is comfortable with its current policy of avoiding political involvement in the region's many disputes. Any isolated Chinese statements that contradict this general position, such as an ambassador's claim in 2018 that his government would consider helping the Syrian regime fight the rebels in Idlib, are immediately dismissed.[10]

Chinese Arrival in Arabian Eye

China has distinguished relations with all Arab countries, but its most important relations are with the Gulf states and those with revolutionary roots, such as Egypt. The former, with its oil and gas, represents the lifeblood of the Chinese economy, and the latter is based on deep historical ties dating back hundreds of years, its importance in the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as the importance of its markets and its ability to influence the region.

Beijing has focused on upgrading relations with Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, the UAE and other Gulf states[11]High-level exchanges between China and Saudi Arabia have intensified in recent years, and practical cooperation between the two countries has achieved results in relation to the Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, with trade volume reaching $63.33 billion in 2018, and the Kingdom becoming China's largest trading partner in the West Asia and Africa region for 18 consecutive years.

 The two sides also jointly developed the first batch of priority projects for cooperation in production capacity and investment with a total value of $55 billion, other large-scale energy and infrastructure projects, and cooperation in modern technology where Saudi imaging units were launched aboard the Chinese satellite, marking the first and successful attempt by Arab countries to explore the moon.[12]

It seems that there is an important reason that pushed the relationship between the two sides forward, which is Saudi Arabia's fear of the new US administration led by President Joe Biden, as Saudi Arabia realizes that Biden has a new policy different from his predecessor Donald Trump, and may go to lift the protection for the Saudi crown prince that Trump provided for him, in addition to his declaration of a rejection of the Yemen war and his desire to return to the nuclear agreement with Iran, the Saudi rival, and then confirmed his planned withdrawal from Afghanistan, which indicates a decline in US interest in the region, especially as its need for Gulf oil declines.

All of this made Saudi Arabia think about looking for an alternative global power to provide it with a security umbrella to rely on when needed, and so it tried to quickly develop its relationship with China, which was evident during the recent visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Today, Beijing is Riyadh's largest trading partner and a key partner in Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's "2030" vision. It is also the party that has been working with Saudi Arabia since 2018 to build a nuclear plant that Saudi Arabia wants to use to adjust the imbalance of power in favor of Iran.[13]It is willing to provide Riyadh and the UAE with advanced missile technology, and its significant ties and interests with Iran do not seem to prevent it from doing so.

Today, Saudi Arabia is trying to play a balancing game between the United States and China, at least until things become clear regarding its relationship with the Biden administration and the upcoming confrontation between America and China. Therefore, although it is trying to get closer to China, it does not want to lose the United States, and it seems to believe that a special relationship with Tel Aviv, the closest US ally, can guarantee a supportive American position that preserves its interests, and the relationship with "Israel" guarantees it a partner in hostility with Iran, with whom it can cooperate to weaken it.

Even if Riyadh decides to go for reconciliation with Tehran, Beijing, with its hundreds of billions of dollars in interests with Iran, will benefit, and it will want stability to continue in the region and not have any confrontation that hinders its plans for the Belt and Road Initiative. This reconciliation may push China to put pressure on Iran to prevent it from implementing any projects that provoke Saudi Arabia, and may be a bridge for reconciliation between the two countries, which Beijing is trying today to market as a welcome mediator between regional countries to resolve crises because of its good relationship with everyone.

China is primarily interested in the Middle East and securing stability so that it can implement the infrastructure, ports and communications projects associated with the Belt and Road Initiative and implement them within its timetable as trouble-free as possible, and it is ready to provide all possible assistance to regimes in the region to ensure this, whether military, political or economic support, as it did with Myanmar and Syria, as it increased military support for the Syrian regime and provided protection for it in the Security Council in cooperation with Russia, as the Syrian issue is the most vetoed topic in its history "six times", and it also maintains good relations with the regime of the[14]

It is interesting to note that Yemen is the only Asian Arab country that has not yet joined the Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), which the Chinese government in 2015 made participation in the AIIB the entry point for participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, perhaps due to the war that broke out in early 2015, which may pose a potential threat to the shipping lines that pass through the Strait of Aden, which is a potential threat to shipping lines that pass through the Strait of Aden.[15] However, the relationship with Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which support the conflicting forces in Yemen, is good enough to protect its interests related to Yemen, which is more reassuring in this aspect, but this is not always the case. Saudi Arabia is often accused of being behind the financing of separatist groups in Myanmar, eastern Iran, Iraq and Syria, all areas through which China's Belt and Road Initiative projects pass, which means an accusation of disrupting China's projects and identifying with the US strategy to disrupt its projects and exhaust it in internal and regional conflicts[16]But it also means that a better relationship with Saudi Arabia can ensure that this group is steered away from Chinese projects and interests, ensuring their security in turbulent environments.

China's Iran deal and its relevance to the Middle East

With the arrival of the current US administration led by President Joe Biden, a state of anxiety prevailed among anti-Iranian countries due to the new administration's hesitation in dealing with the Iranian nuclear file, and some believe that the current administration tends to avoid confrontation with Tehran at the expense of strengthening the confrontation with Russian, Chinese and North Korean threats.

Some attribute this belief to signs of Washington's intention to reduce its military presence in the region, which was reflected in some decisions, including the withdrawal of batteries of Patriot air defense missile systems, one of them from Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia without disclosing it, in addition to considering withdrawing drones and anti-missile systems for deployment in other regions.[17]

This came as the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran signed a 25-year cooperation agreement to strengthen their long-term economic and political relationship worth $400 billion, which will increase Iran's dependence on China, which offers it a vital economic lifeline amid U.S. sanctions.[18]

The agreement is expected to deepen China's influence in the Middle East and strengthen the Chinese presence in Iran's areas of influence on the Mediterranean coasts, and in Syria and Iraq, the economic partnership agreement could contribute to expanding the "Belt and Road Initiative" to include the Gulf region, Iraq and Syria, and turning Damascus into a major trade center between Iran, Turkey and Iraq, in a future partnership that the United States may see as a threat to its interests and influence in the strategically important region, both security and economically[19]Iran considers the Silk Road project to be an important initiative that would bring the countries along this route closer to each other, in contrast to the United States, which seeks to build walls to create distance between peoples, according to the Iranian vision.[20]

 China and Israeli-Palestinian relations

The Palestinian shores from Gaza to Haifa are the natural terminus of the Silk Road, as they have been for more than a thousand years. Although the de facto authority on this spot today is an occupying power, this does not seem to matter much to China. What matters is the extent to which this authority controlling this sensitive spot on the Mediterranean coast is willing to engage with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

That the Israeli occupation has a desire to participate in BRI projects is evidenced by the early signing of a partnership in the Asian Infrastructure Bank, and the two sides' growing economic and militarization projects are complementary to BRI projects.[21]

Israel also views the Chinese initiative as a source of profit, in light of the availability of its modern infrastructure, which does not need a long time to be integrated or developed to integrate with the proposed initiative's projects, unlike other Asian countries that seek to join the Algerian route. Perhaps one of the most important projects that the two parties aim to implement in this context is the use and development of the route from the Red Sea port of Eilat by land to the ports of Ashdod, Ashkelon, and Haifa.

Israel seeks to exploit the recent normalization agreements with the Arab regimes, and the undeclared relations with some other regimes, through projects that serve integration into the initiative, the most prominent of which is a railway project that could extend from the Gulf through Saudi Arabia, through Jordan, which has long talked about its plans to establish such a railway, all the way through the occupied Palestinian territories to Haifa on the Mediterranean Sea. If it happens, it would be the highest aspiration of Israel, because in addition to making huge profits from this short and efficient line, it would establish it as a natural part of the international system in the region.[22]

On the Palestinian side, China also maintains distinguished relations with the Palestinian Authority, and repeatedly and clearly declares support for legitimate Palestinian rights. Recently, through Chinese President Xi Jinping, China put forward a "four-point vision" to settle the Palestinian issue, and at the eighth session of the ministerial meeting of the China-Arab Cooperation Forum held in 2018, he emphasized support for the just Palestinian cause and firm support for bringing peace negotiations between Palestine and Israel out of the deadlock as soon as possible based on the "two-state solution" and the "Arab Peace Initiative."[23]

China's desire to play a role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the growing importance of the Palestinian issue in its foreign policy, was also reflected in the statements made by the Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister during his recent visit to the region, during which he announced Beijing's willingness to host peace talks between Palestinians and Israelis, given that we have witnessed in the recent confrontation between Palestinians and the Israeli occupation, Chinese positions that the occupation considered pro-Palestinian and anti-Semitic.[24]

One of China's voting habits at the UN is to support all anti-Israel resolutions, fully aware that Gulf governments are quietly seeking cooperation with the Israeli government on many fronts, but as long as its official position remains lukewarm, China will continue to vote accordingly.[25]

However, it should be noted that China's relationship with Israel began with Chinese reluctance and Israeli interest in the 1950s and 1960s, through mutual Chinese and Israeli flirtation and a secret relationship in the 1970s and 1980s, to normalization in the 1990s at all levels, and the conclusion of strategic alliances.[26]

Beijing believes that developing its relations with Israel will not have any negative consequences for its relations with the Arab countries, given the increase in direct or indirect Arab relations with Israel, as China's relations with the Arab countries are developing rapidly on the one hand, and they are also developing with Israel on the other. The volume of Sino-Arab trade increased from about 51 billion dollars in 2005 to 109 billion dollars in 2009 and about 70 billion dollars in the first half of 2010, and the volume of Israeli-Chinese trade increased to 6.7 billion dollars, up by about two times over the same period.[27]

However, this relationship is viewed by the United States with suspicion and concern, and is understood as a crowding out of American influence and a direct threat to its interests. This has triggered criticism from Washington accusing Tel Aviv of undermining the American strategy aimed at weakening China by enabling the latter to build an advanced technology industry in cooperation with Israeli companies, smuggling American military secrets provided by the partnership contracts between Washington and Tel Aviv to the Chinese, and enabling the Chinese through infrastructure contracts in Israel to access sensitive places such as Haifa port, which is used by American forces, thus posing a threat to it.[28]

In more than one case, Israel was forced to cancel some military contracts under U.S. pressure, and the U.S. position towards this relationship has undergone a shift, which in some of its manifestations was public, most notably the 200-page report issued by the Rand Corporation of the U.S. Department of Defense, which is the most prominent and unprecedented work in its field.[29]

The administration of former U.S. President Donald Trump pressed to stop Chinese investments in Israel, which included China winning a major tender at the Haifa port that deeply troubled U.S. officials. [30]

Returning to the Middle East, the Chinese presence will take an upward curve, albeit after some time, in order to protect energy lines, raw materials and trade in general, and the Arab region and its neighborhood will be at the heart of this presence due to geopolitics and the concentration of energy sources in it, so it is considered the soft spot for China, which, although it is trying to diversify energy sources, is still heavily dependent on the region's oil, so the region may turn into a field of confrontation between the West and the United States and put its countries before a major challenge that could determine their future.

As for the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran, China is keen to avoid taking sides in the Iranian-Saudi confrontation or inter-Arab disputes such as the embargo imposed on Qatar, and prefers to deal with the Arab League as its main resort for dialogue, including continued support for the Arab League's positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[31]

The Middle East. Arena of conflict

China's increased interest in the region is accompanied by its decline in the US priorities. China, which seeks to utilize the region as a key energy source for the development of its economy, important markets for its goods and services, and important corridors for BRI projects, is the main opponent of the United States, which has made it a top priority to curb China's growth.

Therefore, although America's interest in the region has declined for reasons related to its lack of need to rely on the region's oil due to the availability of self-sufficient sources of oil and energy, and its attempt to concentrate its strategic power in areas near China, whether in East Asia, Southeast Asia or even South Asia in cooperation with the "Quad Caucus"[32]Therefore, its strategy to curb China's rise must logically be based on depriving China of the region's advantages, especially energy, which explains China's constant endeavor to diversify the energy sources it relies on, including its partnership with Iran.

In addition, we saw during the recent Israeli aggression against Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip how the United States was forced to enter the line of calm and mediation between the two sides at the highest levels, even the press conference that included both President Biden and the Prime Minister of South Korea during the aggression[33]This means that the U.S. strategy of withdrawing from the region is unrealistic or overstated.

Some see China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a quiet and gradual way to control and strengthen influence by Beijing, without creating a clash or tension with other powers, especially the United States, through which it tries to strengthen cooperation with the countries of the Middle East, as China has signed documents related to the initiative with 19 countries in the Middle East, and China is now the largest foreign investor in the Middle East, building infrastructure worth billions of dollars.[34].

Even if America accepts the Chinese logic that portrays this expansion as mutually beneficial economic cooperation, economic power is necessarily followed by military power according to the American understanding, which means that it is only a matter of time before China competes with America in the region and tries to dominate it, and therefore, from the American point of view, this must be prevented, and therefore friction between the two powers in this region is not unlikely and could take many forms, which could crystallize through American pressure on regional countries to limit their rush towards China, especially those traditionally seen as allies of America, such as the countries of the UAE and China.

On the other hand, China is trying to involve Arab countries in its economic plans and grant them financial, political or infrastructure concessions to gain satisfaction with its plans and projects, make its arrival welcome without any issues or not appear as an outcast in the region, and create a split in the position of the Middle East countries from the position of the United States, at least for the time being. During Wang Yi's visit to the region, he visited Turkey, Iran, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain, which is China's largest trading partner and a major partner, and Saudi Arabia was the largest supplier of crude oil to China in 2020, overtaking Russia.[35]

China has made "comprehensive strategic partnerships" with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and now Iran, by signing a 25-year comprehensive strategic agreement on economic and security cooperation with Tehran, which is also rumored to include expanded military assistance, training, and intelligence sharing.

The change in the US attitude towards the region can be understood through the "National Defense Strategy" document issued by US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis in 2018, which stated that "strategic competition between states rather than terrorism is now the primary national security concern of the United States." Washington viewed the Middle East as the core of the counterterrorism policy that has been pursued since the 9/11 attacks, but it is not home to any global powers or major superpower competition, which reduces the importance of the region in the new policy, and some may point to Russia's intervention in Syria to contradict this idea, but[36]

While most Middle Eastern countries enjoy strong security and political relations with the United States, they share with China strong and growing economic relations that have an impact on other aspects such as political and military, and the competition between Beijing and Washington for interests in the Middle East gives a space of maneuvering that may benefit countries in obtaining privileges from both powers and taking advantage of them, especially in the context of communication technology and the Chinese G5, and in building infrastructure.[37]

This does not mean that the United States is completely out of the Middle East market, because global energy prices are vulnerable to collisions due to the turmoil and influences in this region, so Beijing and Washington will be cautious in the region because of the impact of any clash or instability on energy security and the economy of both countries, so both will want relative calm in the region and confrontation by quiet means.

It seems that the People's Republic of China has become more explicit in its regional and international goals and seeks to strengthen its role in global politics, maintain its economic growth, secure shipping lanes, continue the flow of oil, and ensure trade interests with countries in the region. The Middle East can be considered the vital region in the world where China's interests converge with the United States, especially since both will be concerned if there is a disruption in oil exports from the Gulf or in the movement of navigation.[38]

The US-China rivalry, especially over the fifth generation of telecommunications and other issues, makes the countries of the region realize that the new reality will produce great pressure on them in the future, as happened in the Chinese projects in the Israeli occupation state and the US pressure to cancel some of them, and the release of wholesale US criticism of Israel and accusing it of undermining the US strategy aimed at weakening Beijing by enabling it to build an advanced technology industry, smuggling military secrets to it, and enabling it through infrastructure contracts to access sensitive places such as Haifa port used by US forces.[39]

This tension with the US administration caused a division of opinion within the Israeli elite and led Israel to deny Chinese companies tenders for large projects. This scenario may be repeated with Arab countries if the US feels threatened by the growth of Chinese projects in the region.[40]

It must be noted here that what is happening these days in the Israeli occupation state over the nature and management of the relationship with China, in light of the strategic partnership with the United States of America, could be extended to many countries in the Arab region, and is likely to increase and cause a rift between decision-makers in the same country, in addition to external pressures that could have a serious impact on the independence of these countries and their ability to pursue self-interest.

Conclusion

The Middle East and the Arab world is a new arena for Chinese influence, through which China is trying to secure its energy sources in addition to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative, of which the Middle East is one of the pillars, and is trying as much as possible to maintain a diplomatic relationship with all parties in the region and support stability to achieve its goals, and try to expand its geographical influence within the conflict with the United States.

The Middle East is considered the heart of the world and the link between East and West, characterized by its shipping lanes and its wealth, especially energy and oil resources. It was one of the arenas that witnessed geopolitical competition during the Cold War period, and perhaps it is one of the areas that remained a field of attraction between influential international powers. The United States views the Middle East as one of the pillars of its influence in the international arena due to its geographical location, through which a large share of international trade passes.[41]

As for China, as mentioned, it depends on the Middle East for energy supplies, a source of market value, and economic connectivity projects at the international level, specifically the "Belt and Road" initiative, and global trade cannot flow normally if its movement is hindered in sensitive ports and corridors located in the Middle East, such as Arab ports on both the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea, or international corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandab Strait or the Suez Canal, meaning that continued Chinese, American and even global economic growth is closely linked to the Middle East.[42]

President Biden tried to shift the focus of his country's attention from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region, but in practice, it is impossible to divert attention from this region because of its vital interests for the United States and threats such as the Iranian nuclear program, and while the United States has retreated from its attempt to shift from the region, it has not made progress, as its fear of further involvement in the region has opened the way for its competitors.

Russia, for example, found a space for itself to revive the old role of the Soviet Union by intervening in Syria, and China sees that the United States has entered a phase of decline, albeit long-lasting, and sees itself as the rising global power, and a power of this size cannot ignore a region like the Middle East in the twenty-first century and beyond, and began moving to play a real role in the region as China Daily, published by the ruling party, revealed a five-point plan "to achieve security and stability in the Middle East, by providing constructive impulses to the Palestinian-Israeli dialogue, completing the nuclear agreement with Iran, and building a security framework in the region[43]

In conclusion, the Arab countries can choose to align themselves with the United States of America as a hegemonic power over the world and the region, or with China as a rising and promising power, especially after having experienced the former up close, but they do not really have to do so if there is a unified Arab or Islamic project that prioritizes the interest of the region and its people over narrow interests and returns the initiative and influence to the self rather than the international factor, thus preventing the Arab region from becoming a field of confrontation that could burn the region and turn its people into free fuel for a war in which they have no interest.

In this regard, the strategic importance of the region throughout history cannot be ignored, which made it vulnerable to the ambitions of the major powers in the East and West. Therefore, inspiration from history is required when looking for a way out of the impasse in the region, which made it unable to deal on an equal footing with the major powers and dependent on the protection of foreign power for its security. It is not required for the region to become involved in the confrontation between the major powers, or to move peacefully - at best - from under the American umbrella to the Chinese one. Rather, the region should lead a real project that produces strong governments that work to build a united front on the principle of complementarity and mutual benefit, even if it is not possible to have a dominant regional power that gathers the region behind it, as was the case during the Ottoman Empire and its predecessors among the major Islamic states, a great and perhaps existential challenge before the peoples of the region and their leaders.

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21. Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Sino-Israeli Relations: Markets and Arms, September 11, 2011: https://bit.ly/2CfArYU 
22. 22- Anadolu Agency, "Peace Railway" Details linking Israel with Jordan and Gulf countries, November 2018: https://bit.ly/34CE9Xl
23. Al Jazeera, Palestinian Foreign Minister: We are ready to make China's peace initiative a success, March 2021: https://bit.ly/2Rtya3L
24. Independent, Bolton lobbied to block Chinese companies from entering Israel, May 28, 2019: https://bit.ly/3adqTKs 
25. Deutsche Welle, China plans to host peace talks between Palestinian and Israeli figures, March 2021: https://bit.ly/2T559fz
26. Anadolu Agency, after Corona, Washington is more concerned about Israel's relations with China, May 15, 2020: https://bit.ly/31zO9P3
27. China-Arab Cooperation Forum, full transcript of Wang Yi's interview with Al Arabiya TV, March 2021: https://bit.ly/3uO8OeC
28. Deutsche Welle, "Belt and Road" - China's strategy to dominate the Middle East, April 2021: https://bit.ly/2STRR5e
29. 29 The Washington Institute, China in the Middle East: Following in the Footsteps of the United States, June 2021: https://bit.ly/3uM7ARh
30. Mobile operator Zain, Zain KSA launches 5G leased lines for the business sector, November 2019: https://bit.ly/3vZUEIO
31.   Emirates Policy Center, Dimensions of US-China Rivalry and its Impact on the Middle East, March 2021: https://bit.ly/3fJwigK
32. Anadolu Agency, US pressure denies a Chinese company a tender in Israel, May 2020: https://bit.ly/3cf74ok
33. France 24, China calls for resolving the Gulf crisis through dialogue, July 2017: https://bit.ly/3x2Ee2s
34. Independent, Bolton lobbied to block Chinese companies from entering Israel, May 28, 2019:  https://bit.ly/3adqTKs
35. Arabi21, Quad and vaccine diplomacy, March 2021: https://bit.ly/34UajO4
36. International Institute for Iranian Studies, US-China rivalry and its implications for the Middle East, April 2021: https://bit.ly/3nZ3Rhe
37. BBC Arabic, Has Iran become China's gateway to increasing its influence in the Middle East?, April 2021: https://bbc.in/2RB6oCt

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3. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, China's Middle East Policy: Speak Softly and Wave a Large Purse, June 2019: https://bit.ly/3lGOJ6R
4. The Wall Street Journal, Amid U.S. Pressure, Israel Rejects Chinese Bid for Major Infrastructure Project, May 26, 2020: https://on.wsj.com/33MZiib 
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[1] Sputnik Arabia, China's foreign minister to visit 6 countries in the Middle East, March 2021: https://bit.ly/2PDXjbp

[2] RAND Corporation, China in the Middle East: The Cautious Dragon, 2016: https://bit.ly/2RhP4C3

[3]   The Brookings Institution, China's Changing Oil Strategy and its Foreign Policy Implications Sergei Trous, September 1999: https://brook.gs/3hy0TLP

[4]  Nizar Zeidan, U.S.-China Relations: Convergences and Divergences, International Policy Council, 1998: No. 132

[5] Li Weijian, China-Middle East Bilateral Relations and the Importance of this Region in Chinese Strategy, No. 6, 2004, p. 20.

[6] China-Arab Cooperation Forum, Chinese Foreign Minister reviews his fruitful tour of the Middle East and its role in enhancing cooperation with countries in the region, March 2021: https://bit.ly/2REMy9u

[7] BBC, China-India clashes: New border clashes and reports of casualties on both sides, January 2021: https://bbc.in/3ciVRDi

[8] Academy of International Relations, China's Belt and Road Project: One Road, September 2019: https://bit.ly/3ikzq4z

[9]   The European Council on Foreign Relations, China's great game in the Middle East, October, 2019: https://bit.ly/33m4jMO

[10]   Shabakat Sham, Chinese embassy denies participation in any military operation in Idlib and Al-Watan newspaper We mistranslated, August 2018: https://bit.ly/2FiYkk4

[11] Embassy of the People's Republic of China to the United Arab Emirates, Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi gives a written interview to Emirates News Agency, March 2021: https://bit.ly/3z7BBOL

[12] Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi being interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, April 2019: https://bit.ly/3f0c80F

[13] Arabi21, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the game of international balances, April 2021: https://bit.ly/2Q6bu9p

[14] Al-Masry Al-Youm, Morsi to visit China on Monday to discuss trade between the two countries, August 2012: https://bit.ly/2Sw5YNY

[15] Reuters, Conflict in Yemen increases risks to key maritime routes for oil transportation in the region, March 2015: https://reut.rs/3cbOcXf

[16] Al Jazeera.net, China's Belt and Road Initiative and the imperative of Arab geography, July 2017: https://bit.ly/3bhnlbT

[17] RT, Report: Washington withdraws some troops from Gulf, considers options to protect Saudi Arabia, January 2021: https://bit.ly/2TCram8

[18] Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Iran, China and the 25-year treaty: Are relations turning into a deep strategic partnership?", June 2020: https://bit.ly/3phoHcr

[19] Anadolu Agency, Will the Iran-China agreement change the map of influence in the Middle East?, May 2021: https://bit.ly/3h63y2R

[20] World TV, Iran's ambassador to Beijing: Relations between Iran and China will witness a remarkable development, December 2020: https://bit.ly/3f2iOLu

[21] Al Jazeera.net, China's Belt and Road Initiative and the imperative of Arab geography, July 2017: https://bit.ly/3bhnlbT

[22] Anadolu Agency, "Peace Railroad" Details linking Israel to Jordan and the Gulf states, November 2018: https://bit.ly/34CE9Xl

[23] Al Jazeera, Palestinian Foreign Minister: We are ready to make China's peace initiative a success, March 2021: https://bit.ly/2Rtya3L

[24] Deutsche Welle, China plans to host peace talks between Palestinian and Israeli figures, March 2021: https://bit.ly/2T559fz

[25] The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, China's Middle East Policy: Speak Softly and Wave a Large Purse, June 2019: https://bit.ly/3lGOJ6R

[26] Bakr Misbah, The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Arab Future Council: No. 188, 1988 

[27]  Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Sino-Israeli Relations: Markets and Arms, September 11, 2011: https://bit.ly/2CfArYU 

[28] Independent, Bolton lobbied to block Chinese companies from entering Israel, May 28, 2019: https://bit.ly/3adqTKs 

[29]  The Wall Street Journal, Amid U.S. Pressure, Israel Rejects Chinese Bid for Major Infrastructure Project, May 26, 2020: https://on.wsj.com/33MZiib 

[30] Anadolu Agency, after Corona, Washington is more concerned about Israel's relations with China, May 15, 2020: https://bit.ly/31zO9P3

[31] France 24, China calls for resolving the Gulf crisis through dialogue, July 2017: https://bit.ly/3x2Ee2s

[32] Arabi21, Quad and vaccine diplomacy, March 2021: https://bit.ly/34UajO4

[33] USA Today, Gaza cease-fire, Biden hosts S. Korea leader, 'The Me You Can't See': 5 things to know Friday, May 21: https://bit.ly/34R6SaX

[34] China-Arab Cooperation Forum, full transcript of Wang Yi's interview with Al Arabiya, March 2021: https://bit.ly/3uO8OeC

[35] Deutsche Welle, "Belt and Road" - China's strategy to dominate the Middle East, April 2021: https://bit.ly/2STRR5e

[36] The Washington Institute, China in the Middle East: Following in the footsteps of the United States, June 2021: https://bit.ly/3uM7ARh

[37] Mobile operator Zain, Zain KSA launches 5G leased lines for the business sector, November 2019: https://bit.ly/3vZUEIO

[38] Emirates Policy Center, Dimensions of US-China Rivalry and its Impact on the Middle East, March 2021: https://bit.ly/3fJwigK

[39] Independent, Bolton lobbied to block Chinese companies from entering Israel, May 28, 2019: https://bit.ly/3adqTKs 

[40] Anadolu Agency, US pressure denies a Chinese company a bid in Israel, May 2020: https://bit.ly/3cf74ok

[41] Chas W. Freeman, Jr., The United States, the Middle East, and China, The Middle East Policy Council, accessed Apr,19, 2021, https://bit.ly/3sufeyB

[42] International Institute for Iranian Studies, US-China rivalry and its implications for the Middle East, April 2021: https://bit.ly/3nZ3Rhe

[43] BBC Arabic, Has Iran become China's gateway to increasing its influence in the Middle East?, April 2021: https://bbc.in/2RB6oCt